Radar Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) does not always involve cooperative or even friendly environments or targets. The environment in general, and an adversary in particular, may offer numerous characteristics and impeding techniques to diminish the effectiveness of a radar ISR sensor. These generally fall under the banner of jamming, spoofing, or otherwise interfering with the Electromagnetic (EM) signals required by the radar sensor. Consequently mitigation techniques are often prudent to retain efficacy of the radar sensor. We discuss in general terms a number of mitigation techniques.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is to elicit information in order to determine truth. To a warfighter, knowledge of truth facilitates speed of maneuver, economy of effort, and precision of engagement; all highly desirable attributes for friendly entities, but not so much by/for an adversary. 1 We define these means of disruption as follows.
Jamming is the overwhelming of a desired signal with another undesired signal meant to disrupt the utility of the desired signal.
Spoofing is the generation of false signals meant to fool a receiver into detecting targets or target characteristics/features, or signal measurements in general, that aren't really true. This is also referred to as "Deception Jamming" or "Repeater Jamming."
Interference is any disruptive technique that is not otherwise jamming or spoofing. For the purposes of this paper, it includes eliminating sources/resources, or otherwise damaging links.
We opine that it makes little sense to barricade the front door while at the same time leaving the back door wide open. Similarly, it makes little sense to address any one of these listed mechanisms while ignoring the other(s). An adversary is not likely to be so cooperative.
The open literature contains a number of books and papers that address the topic of EW against radar systems and mitigation schemes. With no intent to offer a complete bibliography on the topic, we offer a very few samples as representative of the breadth.
A good introduction on radar jamming is given in a chapter by Farina in the book edited by Skolnik. Electronic Warfare with respect to SAR is addressed in a book by Goj. 3 A number of SAR jamming measures are discussed by Wu, et al. 4 Anti-jamming techniques for SAR are discussed by Rosenberg and Gray. 5 We further opine that a literature search on the topic will bring an avalanche of results.
In the following, we examine the previously enumerated jamming/spoofing/interference mechanisms in more detail, along with mitigation measures, but still only at a cursory level. This paper is essentially a compendium of thoughts and ideas from the open literature on the topic, and an updated summary of an earlier report. 6 
THE RADAR SIGNAL
Direct jamming/spoofing/interference of the radar signal itself can occur by a variety of mechanisms. These include, but are not necessarily limited to 1. Raising the noise level in the radar data, 2. Adding other narrow-band or wideband energy to the ambient spectrum, 3. Fooling the radar with artificial coherent target echo energy, including decoys, 4. Chaff and/or other confusers and obscurants, and 5. Misdirecting/degrading Direction-of-Arrival (DOA) measurements.
Mitigation techniques might include one or more of the following.
More Power
A fundamental measure of radar data goodness is Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). When excessive noise washes out radar data, an obvious remedy is more signal power to burn through the noise. In the presence of jammers and/or interfering emissions or echoes, the goodness measure becomes Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR). Likewise, more power is usually better if the interfering emissions are additive in nature.
More Effective Radiated Power (ERP) may be had by either greater actual transmitted power, or by increased antenna gain. In any case, more ERP will allow a greater stand-off distance from the adversary's target, itself useful for a number of obvious reasons.
Less Detectable Waveforms
We might expect that many countermeasures to radar, or to ISR sensors more generally, are enabled only when an adversary first detects that the sensor is being employed. Consequently, if a radar doesn't 'trip' the countermeasure, then it may not have to deal with it. This implies that if the radar waveform were less detectable, or identifiable as a radar waveform, then ECM might be avoided. Such radar waveforms are termed Low-Probability of Detection (LPD), or Low-Probability of Intercept (LPI) waveforms. That is, the radar offers some degree of stealth towards an adversary. That said, we stipulate that it remains rather difficult to completely hide a high-power microwave source in the sky.
More Robust Waveforms
A radar waveform's susceptibility to spoofing generally depends on the predictability of the waveform. The less predictable that a waveform is, the more robust it is to spoofing. For example a constant Linear-FM (LFM) chirp waveform is very predictable, and hence very susceptible to spoofing. Random waveforms, or waveforms with random features or parameters, are more resistant to spoofing. In particular, noise and noise-like waveforms have received much attention recently in the radar literature. We offer as entry point into this large body of literature a report by Doerry and Marquette. 
Multi-band Operation
Many ECM techniques, indeed even often-times chaff, are specific to individual radar bands. While one band might be rendered unusable, another band might be clear and available for radar ISR. If a hostile emitter is itself band-limited, the obvious mitigation technique is for a radar to be able to operate on another of a set of multiple radar bands.
Sub-band Channels
If a hostile emitter is band-limited, ECM might be avoided by operating in a different frequency sub-band. For example, a radar with 3 GHz bandwidth may only require a 1 GHz or less bandwidth for 0.3 m range resolution. Consequently, a 3 GHz band offers at least 3 non-overlapping sub-band channels for this resolution. A 3 GHz band offers at least 15 non-overlapping channels to support 1 m range resolution. If a particular part of a 3 GHz band is being jammed, then radar operation might move to a 'clear' channel.
Antenna Null Steering
Antennas have directions of zero-response. These are called "nulls". Almost all antennas have them. Hostile emitters in the direction of an antenna null will be severely attenuated. While Active Electronically Steered Array (AESA) antennas are touted as being able to steer nulls towards jammers or other interfering emitters, even mechanical antennas have nulls that can be directed towards hostile emitters, albeit with somewhat less flexibility.
DOA Techniques
Related to the Antenna Null-Steering techniques, received hostile energy may be evaluated for Direction of Arrival (DOA) with a multi-phase-center antenna. In this manner, spoofed energy might be separable, or at least distinguishable from the desired echo energy. Sidelobe cancellers fall into this category.
Polarization Purity
A well-known technique to degrade DOA measurements (like monopulse measurements) is to echo a contrived crosspol response. Consequently, mechanisms to ensure cross-pol rejection may mitigate this technique. Examples include better antennas with respect to cross-pol rejection, or antenna auxiliary equipment like polarization screens. Brock and Allen provide an analysis of a polarization screen for a dish reflector.
Cognitive Radar Techniques
Cognition is generally associated with a mental process that involves awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment. A step beyond the previous techniques is for the radar to examine its environment, including the local EM spectrum, and then use some cognition to auto-select the best available operating characteristics. This would certainly include the operating spectrum. It might also further select other radar operating parameters like best useable resolution, specific waveform properties, etc. An entry point into the literature of Cognitive Radar is a book by Guerci. 9 Essentially, the radar must have some capacity for best deciding 'how' to best accomplish the ISR data collection task requested of it.
Interference Rejection Techniques
Narrow-band jamming that doesn't overwhelm the radar can be treated like unintentional interference. This energy can be excised with a variety of signal processing techniques. We exemplify one technique for apodizing the effects of interference in a report by Doerry. 10 
Pulse Code Nulling
Digital RF Memory (DRFM) based jammer/spoofing technology essentially captures the transmitted signal and reradiates it towards the radar receiver, typically with some delay or modulation attached. The delay might be an amount that is more than one Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI). In fact, for some spoofing characteristics, it needs to be at least one PRI. Consequently the spoofing signal is equivalent to a return from an ambiguous range.
If the pulse latency is known, then pulse phase coding might be employed to effectively null the false spoofing echoes. Such a scheme is described in a report by Doerry 11 to null specific ambiguous ranges, and also described in a paper by Soumekh. 12 We note that this technique makes use of a corollary to a previously mentioned truism, namely that the more predictable an ECM waveform is, the more susceptible it is to ECCM.
High-Dynamic Range Receiver
Radar receivers tend to be very sensitive receivers, typically exhibiting some fairly high gain. After all, they are looking for tiny energy reflections from the target. Consequently they are often sensitive to saturation by high-power in-band emissions from nefarious or other external transmitters, especially when aimed towards them by high-gain antennas. This is a dynamic range issue for the radar receiver. Simply put, receivers with a high dynamic range are less susceptible to saturation than receivers with low dynamic range.
Bistatic Operation
We offer the basic tenet that high-power jamming/spoofing/interference ECM signals are more odious than low-power jamming/spoofing/interference ECM signals. This implies that from an adversary's perspective, an ECM signal emitted through a high-gain antenna directed at the radar receiver is desirable. However, a high-gain antenna is inherently a narrow-beam antenna, which means that the adversary needs to know the radar receiver location with sufficient accuracy and precision to properly aim the ECM signal's beam towards it. A radar receiver by itself is inherently passive. So, if the receiver can be separated from the transmitter in a bistatic mode, i.e. located in separated vehicles or platforms, then the receiver offers a stealthy target to the adversary. As such, the effectiveness of an aimed ECM signal is diminished.
We note that specialized techniques might be developed to jam bistatic radars, as presented by Wang and Cai. 13 
Nonlinear or Harmonic Radar
Nonlinear/Harmonic radar essentially seeks to detect re-emissions from electromagnetically nonlinear targets, where such re-emissions occur at harmonics of the incident interrogating signal. Targets with such behavior include those containing semiconductor junctions, oxidized metals, etc. This adds a new dimension to the problem of jamming or spoofing such signals; increasing the difficulty for an adversary to jam or spoof an 'echo' response.
Passive Operation
The ultimate in stealthy microwave sensing/imaging operation is to not require any transmitter at all, that is, sensing/imaging based on the radiometric emissions of the target itself rather than reflections of a high-power artificial source. This is termed "radiometry." Information on airborne radiometry is extensively published in the open literature.
We note that a subset of radiometry is Synthetic Aperture Radiometry. Essentially, multiple antenna phase centers measure spatial frequencies of received emissions via cross-correlation operations, but different spatial frequencies may be measured at different times as the phase centers change orientation with respect to each other. Information is combined to form the radiometric image. One of the most well-known examples of Synthetic Aperture Radiometry is the Very Large Array (VLA) radio-telescope near Socorro, NM, used for radio-astronomy. The open literature also reveals a number of airborne earth-observing examples as well.
THE NAVIGATION SIGNALS
In most radar systems, navigation signals like Global Positioning System (GPS) are used to aid (keep aligned) an Inertial Navigation System (INS), at the heart of which is an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). For example, we note that even a high-quality navigation-grade IMU, if left unaided, will exhibit accelerometer biases that correspond to a position drift of perhaps 1 nautical mile per hour (standard deviation).
14 In such a case, if relying on an unaided IMU, not only will we have issues with motion compensation of the radar data, but we may not know the location of the radar or any target data with operationally significant accuracy, diminishing its utility substantially.
Consequently, jamming/spoofing/interference of navigation signals like Global Positioning System (GPS) will diminish radar performance by degrading the quality of motion measurement data that the radar often requires to function optimally. Of course, if GPS is eliminated outright, that would also be problematic for many radar modes, not to mention other sensors and the platform vehicle itself. Mitigation techniques to allow useful sensor operation (not to mention aircraft navigation) in spite of GPS denial, or other motion measurement degradation, might include one or more of the following. While we focus here on GPS, we acknowledge that other navigation aids also use radio links, and more generally the comments below are applicable to radio-navigation aids in general.
More Robust GPS
Clearly one answer is to make the GPS subsystem itself more robust with respect to jamming, spoofing, and interference. Lots of folks are working on this already. Specific techniques are beyond the scope of this paper. A corollary to this is to allow employment of other similar services that might not be suffering the same degradation, e.g. GLONASS, Galileo, IRNSS, BeiDou, etc.
Transfer Alignment from Higher-Quality Navigator
The principal purpose of GPS for the radar is to keep the radar's INS/IMU aligned. In the absence of GPS, the radar's IMU may be kept aligned by using the host platform aircraft's own navigation system, which may include a more accurate and stable navigation-quality IMU, or perhaps a more robust GPS, or perhaps even other navigation instruments. Aligning the radar's navigator to the aircraft's navigator is termed a "transfer alignment." Of course, the absence of GPS outright might substantially degrade these other sources, too, as previously noted.
Additional (Backup) Aiding
Sometimes even fairly coarse estimates of some position or velocity parameters can be quite useful to enhancing the utility of a radar sensor. Radar altitude information is particularly useful in simply being able to estimate the necessary depression angle of an antenna for a particular range. For this, a barometric altimeter reading would be enormously helpful. Radar velocity over the ground can be coarsely estimated with the aircraft's airspeed indicator instruments. This might be sufficiently accurate to allow refinement from radar readings themselves.
Ground-Based Aiding
Occasions may arise where the ground station for a platform UAV might have position or velocity knowledge not directly available to the radar itself, be it from ground measurements or from other on-board instruments. Consequently the radar might allow for some manual override, or calibration, of its internal navigator via the command and control link.
Radar Processing Sans Motion Measurement
Radar data products (SAR images, GMTI detection maps, etc.) may be formed even in the absence of any motion measurement information. Although quality may be degraded, newer signal processing techniques might be employed to mitigate the dependence on GPS in order to maintain sensor utility. The idea is to collect and process the data without any (or very minimal) motion information or compensation, letting any focusing be entirely (or mostly) data driven.
Radar as Navigation Instrument
The radar itself may be used to augment a vehicle's navigator. For example, a SAR can image known landmarks to ascertain aircraft position error. Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) radars match radar altimeter data with terrain height profiles. Techniques have already been demonstrated to maintain antenna angular alignment using SAR images. 15, 16 Furthermore, radar Doppler measurements can be used to measure vehicle orientation and velocity components. In fact, a whole class of radars does exactly this, being termed "Doppler Navigation" radars. These principles may be exploited even by more conventional range-Doppler radars. Of course, for the radar to aid the platform vehicle's navigator, it first needs to work well enough to do so.
THE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SIGNALS
Jamming/spoofing/interference of the Command, Control, and Communications (C3) signals will interfere with commanding the radar to do what is desired, or extracting the radar products to a remote operator/user. This is particularly problematic with remote operation, like with a UAV. Fundamentally, if 'external' C3 signal links are severed, then the utility of a radar system must necessarily depend on 'internal' C3 capabilities. That is, the radar must exhibit useful autonomy. We note that while we are discussing the severance of the C3 link due to an adversary's action, we might also at times wish to disable or suppress our own C3 link to advantage (i.e. radio silence) for stealth reasons.
For the purposes of this paper, autonomy means that in the absence of external C3, the radar must still do something useful in spite of the severed C3 connection. We stipulate that autonomy might mean different things to different people, and comes in many shades of gray. Autonomy may span capabilities ranging from a default operational mode (e.g. revert to a basic GMTI WAS mode) to a fully integrated sensor serving some higher cognitive process or mission (e.g. do what it takes to find vehicles of interest in collaboration with other sensors). Some particular autonomous functions might include some of the following.
More Robust C3 Link
Although not an autonomy feature or technique, we would be remiss in not mentioning that one answer is to make the C3 link itself more robust with respect to jamming, spoofing, and interference. Lots of folks are working on this already. Specific techniques are beyond the scope of this paper.
Pre-Planned Mission
Prior to encountering the hostile EM environment, the radar may be queued with a set of preplanned tasks. The corresponding data products would be collected as a default mission in an autonomous fashion in the absence of override instructions from the C3 link. This is consistent with a philosophy that the radar should always have something to do, even when neglected by the operator.
On-Board Mission Data Storage
All radar data generated during its mission should be stored in an on-board archive. While absence of the C3 link precludes real-time utilization off-board the vehicle, archived data does facilitate later non-real-time analysis such as forensic analysis. This on-board archive might even be searchable during flight for exploitation before the aircraft lands, but after having escaped the jamming. Furthermore, on-board intelligence might exploit this archive for subsequent analysis, such as for Coherent Change Detection (CCD), or Pattern of Life (POL) analysis.
System Cognition
The principal reason for real-time radar operation is to secure real-time information to make real-time decisions. The significance of the loss of the C3 link might be mitigated if the real-time decision process were on-board the platform vehicle itself, as part of the larger airborne system. This means that the larger airborne system must exhibit the ability for cognition.
In contrast to the Cognitive Radar Techniques addressed in section 2.9, here we are proposing the radar as part of a larger airborne system be capable of deciding 'what' to do given its mission parameters and current circumstances.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
The following points are worth repeating.
• An adversary's ability to deny the utility of a radar sensor falls under the banner of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability, and more specifically Electronic Warfare (EW). The universe of denial techniques are collectively described as Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM). Techniques to operate in spite of ECM are termed Electronic Counter-Counter-Measures (ECCM).
• Hardening an ISR radar system to a hostile EM environment involves addressing a number of radio links and dealing with a variety of ECM fronts. These include 1. the radar waveform, 2. any navigation radio receivers, and 3. the command/control/communications links.
• A number of mitigation techniques for each of these fronts were presented and briefly discussed.
Ultimately, dealing with a hostile EM environment, especially one that involves surprise, requires retaining flexibility in the design, configuration, and operation of the radar system. It means asking "What can go wrong?" and having a "Plan B" available for when it does go wrong. The alternative is surrendering the ISR capability, and the consequent loss of an information source. Furthermore, since not every degrading pathology can be foreseen, the sensor itself needs to be flexible to even more substantial new and timely implementations, modifications, and enhancements, as well.
